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Court/Tribunal: European Court of Human Rights 
Case: S. and Marper v. United Kingdom 
The case involved Mr. S. and Michael Marper (“applicants”), both who were British 
nationals arrested in 2001. Mr. S. was arrested on January 19, 2001 at the age of eleven for 
armed robbery. When he was arrested his fingerprints and DNA samples were taken. He was 
acquitted on June 14, 2001. Mr. Marper was arrested on March 13, 2001 and was charged with 
the harassment of his partner. At the time of his arrest, his DNA and fingerprints were taken. 
Before the pre-trial review, Mr. Marper and his partner reconciled and charges were not pressed. 
On June 14, 2001 the case was formally discontinued.  
In both cases the applicants asked that their fingerprints and DNA samples be destroyed, but in 
both cases the police refused. The applicants asked for a judicial review in the United Kingdom 
of the police decision not to destroy the samples. On March 22, 2002, the Administrative Court 
rejected the application. On September 12, 2002 the Court of Appeals upheld the decision of the 
Administrative Court.  
In upholding the Administrative Court’s decision, the Court of Appeals stated that the retention 
of the DNA and fingerprints revealed only limited personal information. The Court stated that 
the interference with private life was modest because (1) the samples were kept for the limited 
purpose of detection, investigation, and prosecution of crime, (2) the samples were not used 
without a sample from a crime scene, (3) the fingerprints would not be made public, (4) a person 
would not be identifiable to the untrained eye, and (5) the expansion of the database would be an 
advantage in the fight against serious crime. Furthermore, the Court cited a 1999 case where 
DNA samples obtained from a crime scene matched DNA in a national database. The Court also 
cited statistics where 6,000 DNA profiles were linked to samples taken from crime scenes. The 
crimes that were linked included 53 murders, 33 attempted murders, 94 rapes, 38 sexual 
offences, 63 aggravated burglaries, and 56 drug offenses.  
The relevant statute at issue in this case is the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 which 
allows for the taking of fingerprints and DNA samples. The retention of the fingerprints and 
samples are governed by section 82 of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001. Section 82 
states, in part:  
(1A) Where—  
(a) fingerprints or samples are taken from a person in connection with the 
investigation of an offence, and  
(b) subsection (3) below does not require them to be destroyed, the fingerprints or 
samples may be retained after they have fulfilled the purposes for which they 
were taken but shall not be used by any person except for purposes related to the 
prevention or detection of crime, the investigation of an offence or the conduct of 
a prosecution. 
(3AA) Samples and fingerprints are not required to be destroyed under subsection (3) 
above if—  
(a) they were taken for the purposes of the investigation of an offence of which a 
person has been convicted; and  
(b) a sample or, as the case may be, fingerprint was also taken from the convicted 
person for the purposes of that investigation.  
Appealing to the European Court of Human Rights, the applicants alleged that the retention of 
the samples violated their right to private life enshrined in Article 8 of the Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“Convention”). Article 8 states: 
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private … life … 
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right 
except such as in accordance with the law is necessary in a democratic society … for the 
prevention of disorder or crime …  
The applicants argued that the retention of their fingerprints, cellular samples, and DNA 
profiles interfered with their right for private life under Article 8 of the Convention. They 
contended that the continued retention attached a social stigma along with psychological 
implication, particularly for a minor such as Mr. S. In addition to the interference with their 
private lives, the applicants also argued that the retention of DNA profiles and cellular samples 
interfered with the right for private life of their families because the samples contained genetic 
information that could point to relatives of the applicants.  
The government argued that use of fingerprints and samples was used for a limited purpose and 
did not interfere with Article 8 rights. Such samples were used only for the identification of 
person and contained no intrusive information about an individual or his person.  
The Grand Chamber overruled the Court of Appeals and found that the retention policies 
violated an individual’s right to a private life. The Grand Chamber gave a non-exclusive list of 
issues and elements that fell into the concept of private life including, physical and psychological 
integrity of a person, aspects of a person’s physical and social identity, personal identification 
and links to family, information about a person’s health, and information that identifies an 
individual’s ethnic identity.  
The Grand Chamber stated that the mere storage of DNA or cellular samples relating to the 
private life of an individual amounts to an interference with the rights in Article 8. How the 
information is used is irrelevant. An individual’s concern about possible future uses of stored 
data is sufficient based on the sensitive nature of the information, particularly the potential 
information on the health of a person. The retention of samples is a per se interference with the 
right of private lives.  
Next the Grand Chamber considered the retention of fingerprints. It applied the same standards it 
uses for the retention of photographs and voice samples. In both instances, the Grand Chamber 
considers whether authorities have used the photographs and voice samples to identify the 
person. Likewise, fingerprints contain unique information about a person insofar as they can 
identify a person.  
After establishing that the retention of the samples and fingerprints constituted an interference 
with the right to respect for a private life, the Grand Chamber considered whether the 
interference was justified.  
The applicants argued that retention was not justified by Article 8 since the authorities were 
given large leeway to use the retained information for “purposes related to the prevention or 
detection of crime.” They argued that the purpose was vague and open to abuse while lacking 
sufficient safeguards. The applicants also argued that indefinite retention of information of 
persons not convicted of any crimes could not be considered necessary in a democratic society 
for the prevention of crime. Furthermore, the applicants argued that retention was 
disproportionate since there was no distinction between offenses involved, failure to take the 
applicant’s circumstances, lack of independent decision making process when considering 
whether or not to order retention, and unlimited period of retention. Lastly, the applicants argued 
that retention of the information casts suspicion on people who have been acquitted or 
discharged of crimes.  
The Grand Chamber agreed with the applicants that the section 64 is very general and gave 
authorities too much leeway. The Grand Chamber stated that it is important for a retention policy 
to have clear rules governing such things as duration, storage, access of third parties, procedures 
for preserving the integrity and confidentiality of data, and procedures for its destruction.  
The Grand Chamber also agreed with the applicants that the interference was not necessary in a 
democratic society. Interference is considered necessary in a democratic society for a legitimate 
aim if it answers a pressing social need and it is proportionate to the legitimate aim. However, 
the protection of personal data is of fundamental importance to a person’s enjoyment of his right 
to respect for private life.  
The Grand Chamber narrowed its decision in this case to the retention of fingerprints and DNA 
data to persons who have been suspects, but not convicted of criminal offenses. The Grand 
Chamber noted that England and Wales were the only jurisdictions that allow for indefinite 
retention of information of suspected criminal offenders regardless of the type of criminal 
offense or age of the offender.  All other jurisdictions allowed for the retention of suspected 
criminal offender’s personal information based on the severity of the crime and for a limited 
duration.  
The Grand Chamber was concerned with people in the position of the applicants, people not 
convicted, and the high risk of stigmatization. It found that the retention policy interfered with a 
person’s right to a presumption of innocence when that person has not been convicted of any 
crime. The Grand Chamber placed special emphasis on the effect the policy would have on 
minors such as Mr. S. The retention policy, it was reasoned, would be harmful to their 
development and integration into society.  
The Grand Chamber found that the indiscriminate and indefinite retention of fingerprints, 
cellular sample, and DNA profiles of persons suspected, but not convicted of any crimes, did not 
strike a fair balance between competing public and private interests.  Therefore, the Government 
had interfered with the applicants’ right to private life under Article 8.  
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